From commercial toy-quads to free-ranging hunter-killers: Drone-autonomy levels in Command

April 5, 2025 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment

“True drone autonomy isn’t just about flying without a pilot—it’s about making real-time decisions in unpredictable environments, with limited data, constrained power, and no room for error”
– ChatGPT, reflecting on its siblings on the front line

Uncrewed combat & support platforms (aka “drones”) are all the rage these days in defence circles, and not without good reason. However, they suffer from a fundamental limitation compared to more “traditional” crewed platforms: When not under direct human control (ie. in a realistically comms-challenged environment in any non-lopsided conflict), their ability to autonomously carry out their intended mission is drastically curtailed. By how much? Well, contrary to men, not all drones are created equal – and hence one of the new major simulation features of Command: variable drone autonomy levels.

The question of how much autonomy we are willing to grant to conscious-less machines armed with lethal weaponry has long escaped the confines of legal & ethical theoretical discussions, and is already hammered in the front lines of Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere, as well as the virtual battlefields of the major powers where doctrine, tactics and operational art are forged (see this excellent article by Bill Sweetman on the dilemmas of how best to employ CCAs in a future peer conflict).

Public western/NATO literature on the subject commonly refers to different degrees of “drone autonomy” and then assigns individual uncrewed systems to each of them, to distinguish their autonomous capability. The dev team’s chosen structure closely (though not precisely) follows this public nomenclature. Let us explore the different levels and what they actually mean in the field, when their comms are lost:

– Remotely Piloted: These are the cheap & cheerful quadcopters or small-sized wingcraft or UGVs/USVs you can buy at your local store and have up and flying / rolling / sailing within minutes. Due to their low cost and high numbers, they are very popular in battlefields where comms are not contested. They are remotely-piloted and entirely dependent on their human operator for control. If comms are disrupted, they will stick with their last-ordered course and speed until comms are re-established; if they are not, then they’ll run out of fuel/energy and halt in place (or crash if airborne). While offline, they are unable to take any initiative in order to further their mission.

– Self-Recovering: Things are slightly improving here; if the comms link is lost, these units will loiter/hold at their current location and try to rejoin the comms grid; if successful they will resume their mission, otherwise they will autonomously return to their deployment base/host. It doesn’t sound like much, but retrieving back effortlessly your comms-disrupted force rather than losing them to every comms-jammer out there really does make a difference.

– Changeable Mission: (A more accurate description here might be “Flexible in-mission behavior”, but we don’t get to choose the terminology). A pretty significant jump in autonomy here: The offline vehicle will actually move ahead and try to perform its assigned mission. The bad news: Because of the lack of human oversight, the platform will not perform any pre-emptive checks for own damage, bingo/joker fuel status or winchester/shotgun weapon status – checks that (under human supervision & positive control) would trigger an immediate abort & RTB. In other words, it will press on to its mission even if it is objectively incapable of actually pulling it off and surviving.

– Fault/Event Adaptive: Another major step forward in intelligent behavior here: The platform will actually perform pre-emptive checks for own damage, bingo/joker fuel status or winchester/shotgun weapon status, and thus will avoid needlessly kamikazeing itself into a hopeless situation.

– Multi-Vehicle Coordination: Drones can be quite more effective when they are used in big groups (aka “swarms”). This level of autonomy allows a drone to participate in such a group – but only strictly as a group member. It can perform independent maneuvers only if it is the group’s designated leader.

– Battlespace Cognizant: This is an absolutely huge leap forward, and allows an offline unit to finally evaluate targets and threats on its own, rather than sticking to pre-assigned targets only. It can also maneuvers independently even if its part of a swarm, it can intelligently change its desired home base (though only from available fixed bases, not mobile bases like aircraft carriers) and can evaluate UNREP or air-to-air-refueling opportunities.

– Fully Autonomous: Now we are stepping firmly into Cyberdyne Systems territory. Fully-autonomous drones treat comms isolation almost as a nuisance rather than a crippling handicap: In addition to freely evaluating the targets & threats within their predefined mission parameters, they are also free to evaluate and engage any targets of opportunity that are relevant to their available weaponry. They are also able to modify their mission course instead of sticking to their predefined one, as well as changing their home base destination, either fixed or mobile. Such a unit will most definitely ask you for your clothes, your boots and your motorcycle – and you’ll be wise to accede. If the thought of heavily-armed robots having this freedom of action doesn’t give you pause, you might had been an excellent Carmageddon player.

The autonomy level of a drone is displayed on the DB viewer:

It is also accessible (and editable) through the Lua API:

theU = ScenEdit_GetUnit({name='Anka-S UAV', guid='4FTZEE-0HNA5SMK3O9K4'})
theU.autonomylevel = 1500
print(theU.autonomylevel)

(Note: In DB3000 v510 and previous versions, most drones have their stock autonomy level set to “Undefined”. We therefore recommend using v511+ when using this feature)

One common characteristic of off-grid drones is that, when they get disconnected from their side network, their mission becomes “fixed” for them. In simulation terms, they obtain and use a “private snapshot” copy of their mission state as it was at the moment of disconnect, and use that as reference. Any changes on their original assigned mission are NOT reflected on their private snapshot; for example if the doctrine or ROE settings change, or the area of a patrol shifts around, the disconnected drone sticks to its “known” mission parameters; this is one of the key operational drawbacks of even the most advanced autonomous drones.

The Mission Editor has been adjusted to display such “snapshot” missions, if they are the selected ones (for example, if the player is in direct control of an isolated drone and selects its mission):

The ME window now also more clearly displays platforms who are assigned to a mission but are currently off-grid:

When a unit is off-grid, any attempts to transfer it to another mission or change its mission parameters will fail.

Variable drone autonomy levels is an opt-in scenario realism feature (disabled by default, to avoid disrupting existing scenarios). It is one of the biggest new simulation features of Command, and one of the key new additions on the new upcoming major update.

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Modern warfare comes knocking: Side-enablers and GNSS disruption

January 25, 2025 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment

Quickly now, raise your hand if these headlines sound familiar:

These and other similar titles underline a crucial military transformation during our lifetimes. Modern warfare is not “WW2 but with better weapons”, and the comforts of post-Cold War COIN & intervention / regime-change ops are no longer to be taken for granted. The GPS navigation systems guiding modern platforms and weapons will likely be disrupted (in fact count yourself lucky if the satellite constellation above you survives), and the BLOS comms that forces rely upon for everything from cell-phone connectivity to drone control may or may not be available, theater-wide or locally.

So, how to represent these threats and vulnerabilities, and the opportunities arising from them, in Command?

Side Enablers

What we came up with is the concept and framework of “Side Enablers” (aka “theater access options”): Capabilities that act as force multipliers, enabling options for action – or taking them off the table if they become unavailable.

The most common such enabler is access to satellite-based navigation, particularly with regards to weapon guidance (and more recently, autonomous operation of drones). GPS is of course the most commonly referred example, but GLONASS (Russia), BeiDou (China) and NavIC (India) are also other options.

Such enablers are now available for configuration in Command when editing the properties of Sides in the Scenario Editor:

Clicking the “Enablers” button brings up the available enablers for the selected side:

Checking or unchecking each checkbox enables or disables this capability for the selected side.

Apart from the top Side-level, these enabler items are also configurable on a local basis. The idea here is that in many cases the ability (or lack thereof) to use a certain functionality may be restricted geographically; Starlink’s “no Ukraine” geofencing for its LEO-BLOS comms service is a recent example, but another common case may be the localized jamming/spoofing of GPS on a town or frontline of interest. The reverse may also be true: A given service may be generally unavailable theater-wide but available on a specific area (local beacons for both PNT/GNSS and comms are rapidly proliferating; you can now fit some of them even on artillery shells).

The way we model area-specific availability is through the area & reference-points manager:

By selecting a zone and clicking on the new “Enablers” button, we get access to the same menu of enabler options as on the side level. Embedding this ability on zones also allows taking advantage of all the nice properties already present in them, such as anchoring them on units, contacts or reference points.

Given that the (non)availability of these services can be highly dependent on events happening during the sim execution (or player decisions), it makes sense that the enablers themselves are configurable also through Lua scripting. Here is an example of fetching the enablers for a given zone and modifying them:

local s = VP_GetSide({name='side-A'})
print(s)
local z = s.standardzones
local myz = s:getstandardzone(z[1].guid)
print(myz.enablers)
myz.enablers = {GNSS_GLONASS = true, GNSS_GPS = false}
print(myz.enablers)

GNSS disruption

So, what do all these enablers actually buy/deny you “in the field”?

The first concrete implementation of the enablers framework is, to no-one’s surprise, GNSS disruption. This is a large topic of discussion in western defence circles as an acknowledged vulnerability, given that so many different weapon systems since Desert Storm have come to rely on GPS navigation for guidance – and this trend has been also subsequently replicated in Russia, China & India (to our knowledge, the pan-European Galileo system has not yet been adopted as a guidance component on any fielded weapon system).

GNSS disruption (in the form or jamming, spoofing or complete denial of service) is a huge and highly technical subject, but in the context of terminal weapons guidance its effects are fairly simple: It significantly increases the CEP figure of anti-surface weapons, thus significantly degrading their accuracy. Such weapons typically rely on an internal inertial navigation system (INS) which acts as the primary navigation reference, with the GNSS providing a regular correction to the INS’s inevitable drift. If GNSS is denied, the weapon has to rely entirely on its INS for terminal guidance.

When a weapon is denied a GNSS update, a “NOGNSS” warning is shown next to the weapon icon on the map, to indicate that this weapon is suffering from such degradation:

When the weapon’s impact is evaluated, the INS drift due to GNSS denial is taken into account and may significantly raise the final CEP value used in the impact evaluation. This is presented in the message log, as in this example:

> 8/4/2017 10:08:14 – Weapon: GBU-39/B SDB #993 has been without a GNSS update for 6 min 49 sec. Weapon has INS: 1990s+ tactical weapon INS. Max drift: 105m. Actual drift (CEP increase): 79m

Notice in this example the significant difference between max and actual drift: The max drift represents the maximum deviation from the DMPI if one assumes that all drift perturbations will cumulatively swing the weapon away from the aimpoint. A more (statistically) likely case is that the actual deviation will be somewhere between zero and max; in this case 79 meters.

There is a popular misconception on public discourse, that GNSS disruption can instantly turn a weapon useless. This is a gross exaggeration. The actual effect of such degradation on a weapon’s impact accuracy, and to its overall effectiveness, will strongly depend on the inherent accuracy of the weapon’s INS system, the time the weapon spends in a degraded state (INS drifts with time, not distance covered), the weapon’s warhead type and yield, as well as the type and physical dimensions of the aimed target.

Some recent examples illustrating this:

According to persistent reports, ground-launched SDB (GLSDB) bombs have been ineffective in the Ukraine theater due to extensive GPS jamming/spoofing. This makes sense for a weapon like SDB, whose penetrator-explosive warhead is highly dependent on high accuracy (a near-miss does not produce any proximity damage; it’s direct-hit or bust); combined with an increased flight time (ie. more time to be exposed to GNSS disruption, depending on the reach of enemy EM activity) this creates ample opportunity to disrupt the weapon sufficiently to make it a clean miss.
On the same theater, GMLRS guided rockets have reportedly been highly successful despite facing the very same jamming activity against them. Why? The warheads of these rockets are area weapons (they disperse bomblets) so a near miss usually is as good as a spot-on direct hit. Additionally, their small flight time reduces the opportunity for significant jamming and thus diversion. (Reportedly air-launched SDBs, the very same type as ground-launched by GLSDB, have also been a popular weapon. Why? Presumably the shorter flight time compared to the ground-launched variant makes for a sharply reduced window of GNSS-jamming vulnerability.)
High-velocity weapons in general have an inherent advantage in such conditions because of the time-based drift on INS systems. This is an additional reason that high-speed systems (incl. hypersonics) are a popular avenue for research and development.

Note #1: The current GNSS disruption model applies only to weapons that use INS+GNSS for terminal guidance (JDAM being the prime example), and NOT to weapons that combine INS+GNSS for mid-course guidance with homing sensors for terminal guidance (e.g. most modern cruise missiles). There are a number of reasons for this, incl. the complexity of representing “actual” vs “perceived” weapon position (cue the “missile knows where it is” memes…), as well as the fact that such systems use terminal homing precisely in order to compensate for mid-course guidance errors and thus are less susceptible to GNSS disruption.

Note #2: Currently there is no distinct field in the database to mark the INS performance level of each individual weapon. For this reason a simple “deduction” algorithm is used, based on the weapon properties:

If the weapon is a guided gun round (e.g. Excalibur) or rocket (e.g. GMLRS), assume it uses MEMS-based INS (Assumed drift: 5nm / hr).
Otherwise, if the weapon’s maximum range is under 162NM, assume it uses a “1990s+ tactical weapon”-grade INS (Assumed drift: 0.5 nm / hr)
Otherwise for longer-range weapons, assume it uses a “1990s+ high-grade” INS (AIRS etc.)(Assumed drift: 0.05 nm / hr)

The 162NM (300km) threshold is based on the MCTR regime rules, which treat missile weapons with a >300km range as “strategic”.

Both the Side-Enablers framework and the GNSS disruption feature are now available on the new CMO public beta released on the MG forums. Have a look through them and give us your feedback!

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Promises kept: Command-PE v2.4.1 and the new sim manual now available

December 11, 2024 · Posted in Command PE · Comment

Last September, at the most recent (and most awesome) Command User Event held at Quantico, we showed off the then-imminent-to-release v2.4 major release to Command PE. We also stated that a “hotfix” update was scheduled for release by the end of the year, and that the much-anticipated CPE Simulation Manual would also be made available to current PE license holders in the same timeframe, even in early draft form.

As the year is now drawing to a close, we are happy to fulfill our promises:

* Command-PE v2.4.1 is now available for download to all current users of CPE. Intended originally as merely a hotfix release containing all the tweaks and fixes since the original 2.4 release, it has morphed into a substantial update in its own right.
Its biggest new features are the new “pin-cushion view” option for displaying aerospace units at their true altitudes (this got a lot of attention also at I/ITSEC last week), the tabular & machine-parsible “butchers bill” (list of losses & expenditures) and the option for repeatable-loop movement style on mining missions (ie. you can now define in advance the specific pattern to follow when laying mines, as well as related settings such as interval).
The new update also contains a whole slew of improvements and tweaks to the simulation engine, as well as the latest v509 release of the DB3000 and CWDB databases.

* The first version of the CPE Sim Manual that we deem share-worthy is now available. This document acts as the central point of reference for the overall design and internal simulation mechanics of CPE (and CMO) both for the Command dev team as well as professional customers (this is distinct and separate from the existing CPE & CMO user manuals, which deliberately focus on the user interface and gameplay options).
The sim manual is still in very early draft form, with numerous placeholders, unfilled or unfinished sections; even so, every single user who has glimpsed at it so far has found it extremely eye-opening, useful and illuminating. So we believe the same will hold true for any of our customers who wish to gain a deeper understanding of how Command’s simulation engine works. The sim manual is not generally available for download, but can be provided to active CPE license holders upon request.

The CPE dev team is already hard at work, developing a new set of features (and especially a pair of big whammies) that will define the next milestone of CPE some time within 2025. Stay tuned!

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Command wins the 2024 TIGA award for “Educational, Serious or Simulation Game”

November 29, 2024 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment

The complete winners list: https://tiga.org/awards/2024-winners

As a reminder, CMO previously won the 2019 Charles S. Roberts award for “Best Modern Era Computer Wargame”, and CMANO before it was “Wargame Of The Year 2013” and MS&T Magazine 2017 Finalist.

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Article on Command in the Wall Street Journal

October 27, 2024 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment

Original link (paywall): https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-million-people-play-this-video-wargame-so-does-the-pentagon-e6388f50

Text reproduced below.

A Million People Play This Video Wargame. So Does the Pentagon.

Warfare is changing at a pace unseen in almost a century, as fighting in Ukraine and the Middle East shows. For military commanders, tackling that upheaval demands fast and constant adaptation.

Increasingly, that entails playing games.

Wargames—long the realm of top brass and classified plans—let strategists test varying scenarios, using different tactics and equipment. Now they are filtering down the ranks and out among analysts. Digitization, boosted by artificial intelligence, helps yield practical lessons in greater safety and at lower cost than staging military maneuvers would. Wargames can also explore hypotheticals that no exercise could address, such as nuclear warfare.

Proponents of wargames include Tim Barrick, a retired Marine colonel who is now wargaming director at Marine Corps University. He drills students using board games and computers. In one online exercise, he pushed eight Marine majors repeatedly through the same Pacific military engagement, using a program called Command: Professional Edition.

This software is unusual because it didn’t originate with a defense contractor or institute, as most wargames do. It is a simulation program built and marketed by gamers with almost no military background—and rooted in Tom Clancy novels. Users of all stripes have made it a surprise hit.

Over the two months that Barrick’s Marine majors played Command PE, as it’s known, their creativity grew.

“These are not simple problems,” said Barrick, who previously ran the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s wargaming division. “It’s not like we’re asking them to play checkers.”

The game has become a surprise hit, for users of all stripes. The Air Force recently approved Command PE to run on its secure networks. Britain’s Strategic Command just signed up to use it in training, education and analysis, calling it a tool “to test ideas.” And Taiwanese defense analysts tap Command PE to analyze responses to hostility from mainland China.

Command’s British publisher, Slitherine Software, stumbled into popularity. The family business got started around 2000 selling retail CD-ROM games like Legion, involving ancient Roman military campaigns.

When Defense Department officials in 2016 first contacted Slitherine, which is based in an old house in a leafy London suburb, its father-and-son managers were so stunned they thought the call might be a prank.

“Are you taking the piss?” J.D. McNeil, the father, recalled asking near the end of the conversation.

What drew Pentagon attention was the software’s vast, precise database of planes, ships, missiles and other military equipment from around the world, which allows exceptionally accurate modeling.

Former Air Force Air Mobility Command analyst Pete Szabo started using Command around 2017 to model military planes’ fuel consumption in battle scenarios.

“It’s been a very powerful tool for us,” said the retired Air Force lieutenant colonel. Convincing his superiors to employ commercial, off-the-shelf gaming software, though, took some work, he recalled. “At first it was like, ‘Nooooo.’ ”

Some officers have long derided wargames as entertainment, navel-gazing or “bogsats,” short for “bunch of guys standing around talking.” But the simulations—especially digital ones—can hone decision-making, spatial awareness and maneuvering abilities, say advocates.

“There’s no doubt that skills in a game matter on the battlefield,” said Arnel David, a U.S. Army colonel who advises the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s top general and helps lead an informal organization to promote wargaming of all sorts, called Fight Club International.

Wargaming, which first took its modern form in Prussia about 200 years ago, got a boost in the U.S. in 2015 when then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work warned that the Pentagon’s wargaming skills had “atrophied.” The military services scrambled to up their game.

Traditionally conducted using maps, grids and dice—essentially sophisticated cousins of familiar board games like Risk and Stratego—some wargames entail tabletop models that resemble electric-train sets or require an entire room.

Computer wargames still generally resemble complex maps more than first-person shooter games such as Call of Duty. But their speed and processing power allow operators to run and rerun scenarios at a tempo never before possible, and to generate scads of data for analysis.

In a project called Gamebreak for the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in 2020, scientists at military contractor Northrop Grumman developed AI models to essentially play Command PE, processing more than 200 quadrillion options—or 2 followed by 17 zeros.

AI is increasingly helping users create scenarios, run games and sift through results for trends and surprises. French wargame maker MASA Group boasts that AI allows its Sword program to be run more easily than rivals’ systems.

Whether AI and advanced software actually improve wargaming and preparations for war is a question sparking battles of its own. Warfare is so complex—buffeted by factors ranging from equipment and strategy to politics, weather and corruption—that modeling all the inputs entails parsing an almost infinite number of variables. Quantifying unquantifiables such as military morale requires arbitrary decisions.

“If all your data for a simulation is garbage, it’s garbage out too,” said Anna Knack, who leads research on AI and security at Britain’s Alan Turing Institute, a government-funded research center.

A Million People Play This Video Wargame. So Does the Pentagon.© Kevin Ray J. Salvador/U.S. Marine Corps

Skeptics say digital wargaming, in an unintended twist, may actually reduce understanding of scenarios because software’s underlying algorithms aren’t accessible to users.

“It takes some of the human decision-making element away,” said Becca Wasser, who leads the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank in Washington.

Advocates say computerization expands enormously both the usefulness of wargames and their range of potential users, often complementing manual games.

“It’s a tool in a toolkit,” said David, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Not all wargames involve combat. NATO, which in 2021 adopted warfighting guidelines that call for “audacious wargaming,” also runs crisis-management simulations. U.S. Transportation Command runs wargames involving shipments and logistics, its area of responsibility.

Wargames that focus on a specific field, such as logistics, are relatively straightforward to design, while modeling big conflicts is vexing.

To simulate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in a tabletop game played between teams of specialists in 2022, modelers hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington spent more than a year designing and preparing the project. Each of 22 iterations took a full day, between which the designers adapted the game to address new issues from each running.

It was a simple battle simulation that Navy Lt. Larry Bond wanted to create in 1980, after using the service’s complex training game, Navtag, onboard his destroyer.

Bond created Harpoon, published as a paper-and-dice game that drew a big following thanks to its extensive technical data on military systems. One fan was insurance-agent-turned-author Tom Clancy.

Clancy tapped Harpoon as a source for his first novel, “The Hunt for Red October,” and used it so extensively in writing his 1986 follow-up, “Red Storm Rising,” that he called himself and Bond “co-authors.”

A Million People Play This Video Wargame. So Does the Pentagon.© Elizabeth Frantz for WSJ

A home-computer version of Harpoon flourished and then faded early this century. Frustrated fan Dimitris Dranidis sought to replace it. The result, Command: Modern Operations, released in 2013, took off as users—many in the military—added and corrected its open-source database.

The database now includes tens of thousands of items, from bullets to bombers, covering almost every front-line piece of equipment used by all the world’s militaries since 1946. Users keep parameters like fuel capacity and operating range accurate.

After Work’s 2015 Pentagon memo sent the services scurrying to rediscover wargaming, an Air Force official stumbled on Harpoon and contacted Slitherine, which held the publishing rights. The McNeils introduced him to Command, which they were also publishing as a consumer game.

“It never even occurred to me that we’d work with militaries,” said Chief Executive Iain McNeil, whose father, J.D., had previously owned a scaffolding business.

The Air Force sent two retired generals to assess the company, seeking to better understand its operations and Command’s database. They invited the McNeils and Dranidis for meetings at the Pentagon, where the newbies shot selfies standing behind the briefing-room lectern.

Slitherine created a version of Command for military and intelligence-agency needs, Professional Edition, addressing their security requirements and allowing them to upload classified data without giving access to programmers or other users, Iain McNeil said.

In the military world, most acquisitions undergo more rigorous testing than consumer products for battle-readiness, but Command flips that paradigm thanks to its evolution. With roughly one million commercial users, Command “gets beat up by the community to a degree that the defense industry just can’t do,” said Barrick, the Marines instructor.

Command focuses on battles and engagements, not campaigns or wars. “It’s really useful if you want a very close look—almost through a soda straw,” said Wasser at CNAS, who sees it as an excellent tool for training and education.

Education was one of the top uses cited at a conference of Command military users in Rome hosted by the Italian Air Force last year, attended by civilian and uniformed defense professionals from the U.S., the U.K., Taiwan and beyond.

German Air Force Lt. Col. Thomas Silier explained how Command offered a way to teach mission planning that mixed classroom theory and real-world experience.

In his seminars, a group of around 20 pilots would face an emergency, like defending a target from an incoming attack. They planned mission timelines and assessed factors such as flying time with a given fuel load. Their proposals were fed into Command, and the simulation played out on a big screen in the classroom.

“It’s a stadium-like atmosphere,” with students cheering when missiles hit the enemy, said Silier. “One student told me it’s more exciting than a Champions League football match.”

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com and Juanje Gómez at juanje.gomez@wsj.com