Indian Amphibious Capability

May 25, 2009 · Posted in Amphibious Warfare, India, Marines, Order of Battle · 4 Comments 

 

While doing some other research I got curious as to how well India could carry out amphibious landings. So did some research…

2009 INS Amphibious Ships and Lift:

Class and # Range and Speed Land Craft Helicopters Lift
Shardul LST (3) 3000 m/14 knts 4 LCVP 1 Sea King 11 MBT or 500 Troops
Magar LST (2) 3000 m/14 knts 4 LCVP 1 Sea King 15 MBT
Polnocny C/D LSM (5) 975 m/13 knts – – Light vehicles or 140 Troops
Vasco De Gama LCM (6) 1000 m/8 knts – – 2 Light tanks and 287 Troops
Jalashwa LPD (1) 7700 m/20 knts 4 LCM 6 Sea King Numerous Vehicles, 900 + Troops.
8000 TDX Hovercraft(Coast Guard) (6) 362 m/42 knts – – 80 Troops

 

Name and Number Combat Radius Speed Lift
Sea King Mk 42 C (6) ~400 miles 144 mph 27 Troops

 

Landing Craft Name and Number Range and Speed Lift
LCM8 (4) from Jalashwa 190 miles/9 knts 2 vehicles or 150 Troops or 60 tns cargo
Sea Truck Type LCVP 220 miles/11knts 1 small vehicle or 30 Troops
BMP-2 Sarath IFV Sea 5knts 7 Troops
* Most data from Combat Fleets 2007 with Wikipedia filling a few holes with landing craft information.

Experts could go into more detail but from an amateur’s viewpoint this is an amphibious Navy still designed to beach. The only amphibious standoff capability is INS Jalashwa with LCM 8 landing craft and Sea King helicopters and this would at most would only be able to stage one battalion’s worth of troops. Ultimately as a navy you need to acquire stand off capable platforms that can stay out of SSM range with fast long ranged connectors that give the flexibility to land when and how needed. The INS just isn’t capable yet above a battalion or so.

There is evidence though that India is serious about acquiring better amphibious capabilities.

First, its published was published in their Maritime Strategy (2007).

Expeditionary Operations

The new strategy recognizes that influencing events on land is one of the primary roles of the Indian Navy. This in itself translates into the ability to conduct operations in the littoral, albeit in a phased manner. Important contributions made by enhanced MDA, manoeuvre from the sea, sea control, sea denial, littoral warfare, and amphibious operations in conduct of expeditionary operations have been recognized. Direct delivery of ordnance from stand-off ranges, both through land attack missiles and by carrier-based aircraft would be accorded priority. Critical capabilities in strategic sealift, heavy-lift helicopters and air cushion vehicles are being augmented. In addition, a fully trained land-fighting force would require close integration of Amphibious, Marine, and Special Forces of the three services. Creation of a Joint Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) along with a Joint HQ would considerably enhance our capability to conduct expeditionary operations

Next the Indian Navy has made significant financial investments in amphibious warfare with the purchase of a Cold War era US Austin class LPD and the completion of 5 LST’s of the indigenous Magar/Shardul classes.  INS Jalashwa (picture above left) was purchased from the United States and commissioned in 2007. This Austin class LPD gives the INS more range, lift capacity and flexibility then its ever had as well as a first step toward a amphibious standoff capability. Likewise the Magar/Shardul (INS Kesari pictured above right) classes of LST’s have increased lift and range than the ancient Polnocny class LSM’s and Vasco De Gama class LCM’s in the Indian inventory. 

Future procurements are certain but unclear. The INS was reported to be interested in acquiring USS Nashville however it appears that the Indian Navy may have declined. Global Security does report that India is looking for many more LST’s, LCU’s and a new class of LPH by 2020. However, there are no sources listed and not very much out in the various BBS’s are backed up by another source. So for now it appears they’re certainly interested however actual designs don’t appear to have been established yet.

Finally and maybe most important, India has has taken some big organizational steps toward an amphibious capability. 

The first is committing land formations to the amphibious warfare mission. The 91st Infantry Brigade of the Sudarshan Chakra Corps was formed in 2009. This dedicated force should reach 5,000 troops in strength and be composed of at least 3 true combat infantry battalions with modern command, engineering, signals and artillery support. India will still continue the tradition of pairing other capabilities with ships (5th Armored Regiment affiliated with INS Shardul) and the utilizing thethe MARCOS Marine Commando force in a the special operations role.

The second is a commitment to education and development of theory and practice. This includes the opening of an amphibious warfare school  and planned amphibious exercises. The school is located outside of Kakinda and in close proximity to where the 91st and fleet support facilities will be located. India also carried out a series of planned amphibious exercises this year called Tropex 2009. You can find some photos here and the intent of what kind of capabilities they are trying to develop are clear.

Th story is that while India is currently well behind they’re moving forward and if you’re doing any gaming/modeling of these forces its probably best to assume that they have no standoff capability above battalion level and would most likely have to beach at least until the 2020 time period (or so).

Anyways curiosity cured. Hope this helps you! If anybody has any more information on this please do post!

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Wedgetail MESA tech

May 24, 2009 · Posted in Blogroll, Uncategorized · Comment 

ELP has dug up an interesting video that details some of the technical aspects of the B-737 AEW Wedgetail’s sophisticated MESA radar.

ELP speculates that the Wedgetail may prove to be the affordable Sentry-replacement solution for a cash-strapped USAF. I don’t see this happening primarily because selecting the B-737 as an AEW platform would be a step back for the USAF in terms of mission capacity (internal volume, cooling & power for avionics & crew) and airborne duration. A more likely path is a further upgrade of the E-3 fleet with AESA radars until airframe fatigue renders their wholsesale replacement inevitable (as is currently happening with the KC-135 fleet).

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The upcoming Polar War(s)

May 23, 2009 · Posted in Blogroll, Uncategorized · 2 Comments 

The Daily Mail has a nice layman’s overview of the political/military ramifications of the gradual melting of the polar ice caps, and the presence of large untapped oil reserves underneath them.

With billions of barrels of oil and a former superpower’s hurt pride at stake, it looks like the battle for the North Pole is ever more likely to be fought not by teams of lawyers, but the old-fashioned way, with a clash of Cold War hardware.

One may entertain the notion that the North Pole may become the next Middle East: A spot in the globe largely unknown and uncared about – until significant energy reserves are located on it.

(Hat Tip: Kobus)

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IRST to be developed for Super Hornet

May 21, 2009 · Posted in Blogroll, Uncategorized · Comment 

FA-18F

After a long absence from airborne IRST systems (the last operational sensors were fitted on some F-4s and early F-14s), the USN looks set to get back into the arena of IRST sensors and related tactics: LockMart was awarded a development contract to develop an IRST for the F/A-18E/F:

“The IRST sensor system will provide next generation capability to counter emerging threats,” said Ken Fuhr, fixed-wing program director at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. “The ability to passively detect and track targets in the absence of radar capability is essential to the Warfighter. It’s all about seeing the enemy. If you lose sight, you lose the fight.”

The F/A-18E/F IRST is a passive, infrared sensor system that enables long-range detection and weapons-quality track of enemy targets under normal and electronic attack environments. The system enhances survivability and lethality in both offensive and defensive counter-air roles.

The USN has traditionally been more appreciative of the dangers of overreliance on radar in a heavy-ECM environment than the USAF, so it may be argued that this event comes as little surprise.

(Hat Tip: Kobus)

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Predator strike sparks debate on UAV employment

May 19, 2009 · Posted in Uncategorized · 5 Comments 

Wired’s Danger Room reports that a Predator strike that killed 25 people in Pakistan has served as the starting point for a debate on a possible moratorium of using UAVs as strike platforms.

This is as much a moral as a political/military point of argument, as the wildly variant comments on Wired’s article indicate. The fundamental question arising (yet again) is whether strikes on a population amongst which enemy guerrillas are hiding are likely to demoralize the locals and thus make them reluctant to support the enemy, or instead harden their resolve and make them even more supportive to the insurgency. This is a recurring phenomenon in counter-insurgency operations since before WW2 and is likely to repeat itself in the future.

UPDATE: The director of the CIA claims that UAVs are the sole effective means of interdicting AQ operations in Pakistan.

What do you think?

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