Autonomous killing machines, comms jamming, 3D terrain view, shoddy anti-ship missiles, doctrine/ROE advances and more: Command v1.08 public-beta now available

April 29, 2025 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment 

It’s been only a few months since the releases of CMO v1.07 and CPE v2.4.1, and the Command dev team has been as frantically busy as ever. The next major update, CMO v1.08, has now been made available for a public-beta preview. The full release notes (and instructions on how to get it) are available HERE.

In addition to the previously covered side-enablers and GNSS disruption, the new update also packs a whole lot of new major features. Let’s take a look.

From cheap closely-tethered quads to fully-unleashed murderbots: Drone Autonomy Levels

We have a separate article dedicated to this new feature, as it’s a meaty one. Doing drones justice is table stakes in 2025, and properly demonstrating their comms vulnerability as well as their different degrees of autonomy is an essential part of this. Drones have different autonomy levels which dictate what they can and cannot do when they are comms-isolated (which is a common predicament in a comms-challenged peer-conflict battlespace). If you thought the flying hunter-killers in Terminator were a bit too sci-fi, prepare to be amazed.

Static on the radio: Comms jamming comes to commercial CMO

Ever since comms disruption and its effects were introduced in Command back in 2017, comms jamming as an attack vector was available only in Command-PE. While it was possible to simulate it in CMO as well (look at the “Bekaa Valley” scenario in the “Shifting Sands” campaign), this required some Lua scripting. Given that the main way to disrupt comms is through jamming, and the importance of this attack vector in disrupting drone communications (and thus highlighting their different autonomy levels) it now makes sense to bring script-less comms jamming also to the commercial version of Command.

If you need a refresher on the effects of having the command and control over your units abruptly cut off, have a look at our original coverage on this feature. Suffice to say, a number of things happen when your radios & datalinks are chocked with static, none of them good.

Grand vistas: 3D Terrain view and vertical scaling

This may be seen as the next evolutionary step for the map UI after the (enthusiastically received) “pin-cushion” view. In addition to showing aerospace units at their true altitudes, it is now possible to display the terrain itself in top-down stereoscopic 3D (users of Google Earth or other GIS apps should be familiar with this). This can be useful for both air and ground operations, in better appreciating vertical differences and understanding how the terrain geometry limits available operational options. Phil Gatcomb has already covered this new feature, check it out.

An army runs on doctrine and diesel: Doctrine & ROE UI/UX improvements

This has been a popular user request: While the various doctrine & ROE options are ridiculously powerful and flexible (and they explain why we don’t have to artificially nerf/OP hardware in order to recreate historical results), keeping track of them and being aware of possible conflicts between them or other issues can sometimes be a chore.

So, we set out to radically improve the UI and user experience on this vital aspect of Command:

Instead of having all baseline doctrine options crammed in a single panel, they are now logically divided by operational branch, in a pseudo-tabbed interface. This makes it faster to locate the options of interest and also allows more space for future additions.

Moreover, the population of options can be dynamically adjusted depending on the type of the selected platform (so for example, if you select a friendly submarine, options related to air operations are not shown). In this example, a single ship is selected, and only the doctrine settings that are relevant to surface ships are displayed:

We asked you if you still wanted/used the quick-access panel for the doctrine options on the right-hand column, and you overwhelmingly said no (and we agreed). So, we ripped that off and replaced it with something you will probably find more useful: An intelligent mechanism for detecting common doctrine-related problems or conflicts and (semi-automatically, with user consent) correcting them. Here is an example of a common issue (conflict between mission- and unit-level WRA setting) being detected and a notice presented to the player, who can then resolve this with just a single button click (click on animation to enlarge):

The system is deliberately extensible so that it can be further enriched in the future with other common issues encountered, as highlighted by community feedback. So, tell us what torments you on doctrine management, and we can try to encapsulate the solution there.

When men were men, and missiles slammed into hills: Early anti-ship missile overland restrictions

Here’s something you may not have realized until now: Early low-flying anti-ship missiles (from granddaddy P-15 Termit/SS-N-2 “Styx” up to and including the first versions of Exocet and Harpoon) had rather primitive systems to keep them flying safely above the sea waves. These early guidance systems (simple radar altimeters or even just gyroscopes) were designed primarily for sea-skimming flight, relying on a relatively flat sea surface to maintain a consistent altitude. They were therefore limited in their ability to follow flight paths that took them overland. When directed overland, the missiles encountered varied terrain such as hills, ridges, or buildings, which their rudimentary altimeters could not detect or adjust for. As a result, the missiles were unable to compensate for elevation changes and often crashed into the ground before reaching their targets.

Now if you are in the middle of the Atlantic or in the North Sea, shooting every Harpoon at hand against the incoming Soviet/Russian Northern Fleet, this doesn’t matter much. But if you are playing hide-and-seek in, say, the Norwegian fjords, the Swedish archipelago, the Aegean Sea or the strait of Malacca, it becomes a real constraining factor real fast.

Post-Cold War littoral operations emphasized this handicap even more, and as a result evolved guidance systems from the mid-90s onwards addressed this limitation. New systems like LRASM, NSM or Onyx/Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile), as well as evolved iterations of older classics like Exocet Block 3 or Harpoon Block 2 have no problem navigating themselves overland, even often using the terrain to their advantage in order to surprise a target ship near the coast.

Command now models this factor with a new opt-in realism option: “ASCM terrain-following restrictions” (disabled by default, to avoid disruption on existing scenarios). When this feature is active, early ASCMs who lack true TF capability cannot overfly land with elevation higher than their cruise altitude (unit is actively blocked from firing, both in auto-fire and also through the manual weapon allocation window). If the weapon is fired nevertheless (e.g. BOL shot) and encounters terrain higher than its cruise altitude, it smashes into it. (This means that is possible, but risky, to fire such missiles over very low-elevation land terrain such as atolls etc. – just like in real life.)

Non-TF ASCMs with waypoint capability (e.g. Harpoon Block 1C) can be fired with a plotted course around landmasses, to avoid the “land between shooter and target” restriction when this feature is active. On the manual weapon allocation window, if the selected salvo has a suitable complex course that avoids landmass, non-TF ASCMs show up as “green” (can fire).

Grinding like a chad: Chainsaw/Grinder patrol movement style

Another consistent request from the user community. The grinder or chainsaw patrol pattern is a naval air patrol tactic used to maintain continuous surveillance or presence over a specific area (typically over the sea) by a sequence of aircraft flying overlapping racetrack or circular routes.

In this pattern, multiple aircraft (such as maritime patrol planes, airborne early warning aircraft, or fighters) take turns flying long, looping tracks in a coordinated sequence, where one aircraft is always on station while others are en route to or from the patrol zone. As each aircraft nears the end of its time on station, the next aircraft arrives to take over, creating a seamless “grinding” or “sawing” motion of coverage. This graphic may better illustrate this:

(original credit: https://x.com/RSE_VB/status/1897710024937365913 )

The purpose of the grinder pattern is to provide persistent situational awareness, surveillance, or defensive coverage over critical areas like carrier strike groups, chokepoints, or potential enemy approaches. Its utility lies in efficiently managing limited air assets to ensure that a surveillance or combat-ready presence is maintained 24/7, while allowing for necessary rotations, refueling, and maintenance without leaving gaps in coverage.

While this patrol pattern was originally developed primarily for aircraft in an air-surveillance context, Command allows using it for any platform type in any kind of patrol mission (e.g. ships in an ASuW, ASW or sea-control patrol).

Other bits of note

  • A whole lot of improvements and fixes related to airstrike-planning logics and refueling. If you’ve given up on a specific scenario (or historical raid) because you couldn’t get the AI to behave exactly as needed, give it another try now.
  • A longstanding problem with scenario performance degrading due to a ballooning message backlog has been fixed. If you have developed a habit of saving & reloading large scenarios every few hours to work around this, rejoice.
  • The “significant hiccup every 1 sim-minute if a lot of airstrikes are preparing to launch” problem has been fixed.
  • All the scenarios in the “The Silent Service” DLC have been overhauled, with all known issues fixed and various tweaks and improvements applied.
  • Numerous other scenarios have received various fixes and improvements, and the DB description files have been updated, courtesy of Steven Lohr and kgambit.
  • Contact datablocks now conform much closer to established NATO & APP-6 standards, discriminating between a contact’s track number and its classification/ID name. The amount of information shown on datablocks (just track & name? track & name and kinematics? everything?) is now also configurable, which can help A LOT in decluttering “busy” maps.
  • The Sentinel-2 map layer now uses per-zoom-level tile packing, which allows increased performance and also faster download and installation, particularly on external hard disks (if the bane of your CMO Steam installation is “stuck at 99% FOR HOURS”, this should be your salvation).
  • The unit-status thumbnail and the DB-viewer now use webp (instead of jpg) as the image format, which thanks to its greater efficiency both takes up less space and is much faster to download (You may temporarily have a shortage of shown images as these are repopulated from the server on-demand)
  • When running in interactive-GUI mode (not benchmark), the simulation thread gets set to “Lowest” priority. This reduces raw sim-engine performance, but has two UX benefits:
    (a) It reduces the impact of sim execution on UI responsiveness (map zoom/pan lag, general UI lag etc.) and
    (b) It reduces the impact of sim execution on the overall OS responsiveness (If you’ve ever observed your entire OS respond sluggishly while an epic missile-spam schlachtfest unfolds in Command, you know).
  • Plus numerous other additions, tweaks and fixes as laid out in detail in the release notes.

Given the “public beta” nature of this release, we are eagerly awaiting for the user community’s feedback. Don’t be shy, tell us what you like, what you hate, and what doesn’t work as designed (or as expected, which isn’t always the same thing). And above all, have fun!

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From commercial toy-quads to free-ranging hunter-killers: Drone-autonomy levels in Command

April 5, 2025 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment 

“True drone autonomy isn’t just about flying without a pilot—it’s about making real-time decisions in unpredictable environments, with limited data, constrained power, and no room for error”
– ChatGPT, reflecting on its siblings on the front line

Uncrewed combat & support platforms (aka “drones”) are all the rage these days in defence circles, and not without good reason. However, they suffer from a fundamental limitation compared to more “traditional” crewed platforms: When not under direct human control (ie. in a realistically comms-challenged environment in any non-lopsided conflict), their ability to autonomously carry out their intended mission is drastically curtailed. By how much? Well, contrary to men, not all drones are created equal – and hence one of the new major simulation features of Command: variable drone autonomy levels.

The question of how much autonomy we are willing to grant to conscious-less machines armed with lethal weaponry has long escaped the confines of legal & ethical theoretical discussions, and is already hammered in the front lines of Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere, as well as the virtual battlefields of the major powers where doctrine, tactics and operational art are forged (see this excellent article by Bill Sweetman on the dilemmas of how best to employ CCAs in a future peer conflict).

Public western/NATO literature on the subject commonly refers to different degrees of “drone autonomy” and then assigns individual uncrewed systems to each of them, to distinguish their autonomous capability. The dev team’s chosen structure closely (though not precisely) follows this public nomenclature. Let us explore the different levels and what they actually mean in the field, when their comms are lost:

– Remotely Piloted: These are the cheap & cheerful quadcopters or small-sized wingcraft or UGVs/USVs you can buy at your local store and have up and flying / rolling / sailing within minutes. Due to their low cost and high numbers, they are very popular in battlefields where comms are not contested. They are remotely-piloted and entirely dependent on their human operator for control. If comms are disrupted, they will stick with their last-ordered course and speed until comms are re-established; if they are not, then they’ll run out of fuel/energy and halt in place (or crash if airborne). While offline, they are unable to take any initiative in order to further their mission.

– Self-Recovering: Things are slightly improving here; if the comms link is lost, these units will loiter/hold at their current location and try to rejoin the comms grid; if successful they will resume their mission, otherwise they will autonomously return to their deployment base/host. It doesn’t sound like much, but retrieving back effortlessly your comms-disrupted force rather than losing them to every comms-jammer out there really does make a difference.

– Changeable Mission: (A more accurate description here might be “Flexible in-mission behavior”, but we don’t get to choose the terminology). A pretty significant jump in autonomy here: The offline vehicle will actually move ahead and try to perform its assigned mission. The bad news: Because of the lack of human oversight, the platform will not perform any pre-emptive checks for own damage, bingo/joker fuel status or winchester/shotgun weapon status – checks that (under human supervision & positive control) would trigger an immediate abort & RTB. In other words, it will press on to its mission even if it is objectively incapable of actually pulling it off and surviving.

– Fault/Event Adaptive: Another major step forward in intelligent behavior here: The platform will actually perform pre-emptive checks for own damage, bingo/joker fuel status or winchester/shotgun weapon status, and thus will avoid needlessly kamikazeing itself into a hopeless situation.

– Multi-Vehicle Coordination: Drones can be quite more effective when they are used in big groups (aka “swarms”). This level of autonomy allows a drone to participate in such a group – but only strictly as a group member. It can perform independent maneuvers only if it is the group’s designated leader.

– Battlespace Cognizant: This is an absolutely huge leap forward, and allows an offline unit to finally evaluate targets and threats on its own, rather than sticking to pre-assigned targets only. It can also maneuvers independently even if its part of a swarm, it can intelligently change its desired home base (though only from available fixed bases, not mobile bases like aircraft carriers) and can evaluate UNREP or air-to-air-refueling opportunities.

– Fully Autonomous: Now we are stepping firmly into Cyberdyne Systems territory. Fully-autonomous drones treat comms isolation almost as a nuisance rather than a crippling handicap: In addition to freely evaluating the targets & threats within their predefined mission parameters, they are also free to evaluate and engage any targets of opportunity that are relevant to their available weaponry. They are also able to modify their mission course instead of sticking to their predefined one, as well as changing their home base destination, either fixed or mobile. Such a unit will most definitely ask you for your clothes, your boots and your motorcycle – and you’ll be wise to accede. If the thought of heavily-armed robots having this freedom of action doesn’t give you pause, you might had been an excellent Carmageddon player.

The autonomy level of a drone is displayed on the DB viewer:


It is also accessible (and editable) through the Lua API:

theU = ScenEdit_GetUnit({name='Anka-S UAV', guid='4FTZEE-0HNA5SMK3O9K4'})
theU.autonomylevel = 1500
print(theU.autonomylevel)

(Note: In DB3000 v510 and previous versions, most drones have their stock autonomy level set to “Undefined”. We therefore recommend using v511+  when using this feature)

One common characteristic of off-grid drones is that, when they get disconnected from their side network, their mission becomes “fixed” for them. In simulation terms, they obtain and use a “private snapshot” copy of their mission state as it was at the moment of disconnect, and use that as reference. Any changes on their original assigned mission are NOT reflected on their private snapshot; for example if the doctrine or ROE settings change, or the area of a patrol shifts around, the disconnected drone sticks to its “known” mission parameters; this is one of the key operational drawbacks of even the most advanced autonomous drones.

The Mission Editor has been adjusted to display such “snapshot” missions, if they are the selected ones (for example, if the player is in direct control of an isolated drone and selects its mission):

The ME window now also more clearly displays platforms who are assigned to a mission but are currently off-grid:

When a unit is off-grid, any attempts to transfer it to another mission or change its mission parameters will fail.

Variable drone autonomy levels is an opt-in scenario realism feature (disabled by default, to avoid disrupting existing scenarios). It is one of the biggest new simulation features of Command, and one of the key new additions on the new upcoming major update.

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Command: Fail Safe has been released!

February 25, 2025 · Posted in Command · Comment 

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Modern warfare comes knocking: Side-enablers and GNSS disruption

January 25, 2025 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment 

Quickly now, raise your hand if these headlines sound familiar:

These and other similar titles underline a crucial military transformation during our lifetimes. Modern warfare is not “WW2 but with better weapons”, and the comforts of post-Cold War COIN & intervention / regime-change ops are no longer to be taken for granted. The GPS navigation systems guiding modern platforms and weapons will likely be disrupted (in fact count yourself lucky if the satellite constellation above you survives), and the BLOS comms that forces rely upon for everything from cell-phone connectivity to drone control may or may not be available, theater-wide or locally.

So, how to represent these threats and vulnerabilities, and the opportunities arising from them, in Command?

Side Enablers

What we came up with is the concept and framework of “Side Enablers” (aka “theater access options”): Capabilities that act as force multipliers, enabling options for action – or taking them off the table if they become unavailable.

The most common such enabler is access to satellite-based navigation, particularly with regards to weapon guidance (and more recently, autonomous operation of drones). GPS is of course the most commonly referred example, but GLONASS (Russia), BeiDou (China) and NavIC (India) are also other options.

Such enablers are now available for configuration in Command when editing the properties of Sides in the Scenario Editor:

Clicking the “Enablers” button brings up the available enablers for the selected side:

Checking or unchecking each checkbox enables or disables this capability for the selected side.

Apart from the top Side-level, these enabler items are also configurable on a local basis. The idea here is that in many cases the ability (or lack thereof) to use a certain functionality may be restricted geographically; Starlink’s “no Ukraine” geofencing for its LEO-BLOS comms service is a recent example, but another common case may be the localized jamming/spoofing of GPS on a town or frontline of interest. The reverse may also be true: A given service may be generally unavailable theater-wide but available on a specific area (local beacons for both PNT/GNSS and comms are rapidly proliferating; you can now fit some of them even on artillery shells).

The way we model area-specific availability is through the area & reference-points manager:

By selecting a zone and clicking on the new “Enablers” button, we get access to the same menu of enabler options as on the side level. Embedding this ability on zones also allows taking advantage of all the nice properties already present in them, such as anchoring them on units, contacts or reference points.

Given that the (non)availability of these services can be highly dependent on events happening during the sim execution (or player decisions), it makes sense that the enablers themselves are configurable also through Lua scripting. Here is an example of fetching the enablers for a given zone and modifying them:

local s = VP_GetSide({name='side-A'})
print(s)
local z = s.standardzones
local myz = s:getstandardzone(z[1].guid)
print(myz.enablers)
myz.enablers = {GNSS_GLONASS = true, GNSS_GPS = false}
print(myz.enablers)

GNSS disruption

So, what do all these enablers actually buy/deny you “in the field”?

The first concrete implementation of the enablers framework is, to no-one’s surprise, GNSS disruption. This is a large topic of discussion in western defence circles as an acknowledged vulnerability, given that so many different weapon systems since Desert Storm have come to rely on GPS navigation for guidance – and this trend has been also subsequently replicated in Russia, China & India (to our knowledge, the pan-European Galileo system has not yet been adopted as a guidance component on any fielded weapon system).

GNSS disruption (in the form or jamming, spoofing or complete denial of service) is a huge and highly technical subject, but in the context of terminal weapons guidance its effects are fairly simple: It significantly increases the CEP figure of anti-surface weapons, thus significantly degrading their accuracy. Such weapons typically rely on an internal inertial navigation system (INS) which acts as the primary navigation reference, with the GNSS providing a regular correction to the INS’s inevitable drift. If GNSS is denied, the weapon has to rely entirely on its INS for terminal guidance.

When a weapon is denied a GNSS update, a “NOGNSS” warning is shown next to the weapon icon on the map, to indicate that this weapon is suffering from such degradation:

When the weapon’s impact is evaluated, the INS drift due to GNSS denial is taken into account and may significantly raise the final CEP value used in the impact evaluation. This is presented in the message log, as in this example:

> 8/4/2017 10:08:14 – Weapon: GBU-39/B SDB #993 has been without a GNSS update for 6 min 49 sec. Weapon has INS: 1990s+ tactical weapon INS. Max drift: 105m. Actual drift (CEP increase): 79m

Notice in this example the significant difference between max and actual drift: The max drift represents the maximum deviation from the DMPI if one assumes that all drift perturbations will cumulatively swing the weapon away from the aimpoint. A more (statistically) likely case is that the actual deviation will be somewhere between zero and max; in this case 79 meters.

There is a popular misconception on public discourse, that GNSS disruption can instantly turn a weapon useless. This is a gross exaggeration. The actual effect of such degradation on a weapon’s impact accuracy, and to its overall effectiveness, will strongly depend on the inherent accuracy of the weapon’s INS system, the time the weapon spends in a degraded state (INS drifts with time, not distance covered), the weapon’s warhead type and yield, as well as the type and physical dimensions of the aimed target.

Some recent examples illustrating this:

  • According to persistent reports, ground-launched SDB (GLSDB) bombs have been ineffective in the Ukraine theater due to extensive GPS jamming/spoofing. This makes sense for a weapon like SDB, whose penetrator-explosive warhead is highly dependent on high accuracy (a near-miss does not produce any proximity damage; it’s direct-hit or bust); combined with an increased flight time (ie. more time to be exposed to GNSS disruption, depending on the reach of enemy EM activity) this creates ample opportunity to disrupt the weapon sufficiently to make it a clean miss.
  • On the same theater, GMLRS guided rockets have reportedly been highly successful despite facing the very same jamming activity against them. Why? The warheads of these rockets are area weapons (they disperse bomblets) so a near miss usually is as good as a spot-on direct hit. Additionally, their small flight time reduces the opportunity for significant jamming and thus diversion. (Reportedly air-launched SDBs, the very same type as ground-launched by GLSDB, have also been a popular weapon. Why? Presumably the shorter flight time compared to the ground-launched variant makes for a sharply reduced window of GNSS-jamming vulnerability.)
  • High-velocity weapons in general have an inherent advantage in such conditions because of the time-based drift on INS systems. This is an additional reason that high-speed systems (incl. hypersonics) are a popular avenue for research and development.

Note #1: The current GNSS disruption model applies only to weapons that use INS+GNSS for terminal guidance (JDAM being the prime example), and NOT to weapons that combine INS+GNSS for mid-course guidance with homing sensors for terminal guidance (e.g. most modern cruise missiles). There are a number of reasons for this, incl. the complexity of representing “actual” vs “perceived” weapon position (cue the “missile knows where it is” memes…), as well as the fact that such systems use terminal homing precisely in order to compensate for mid-course guidance errors and thus are less susceptible to GNSS disruption.

Note #2: Currently there is no distinct field in the database to mark the INS performance level of each individual weapon. For this reason a simple “deduction” algorithm is used, based on the weapon properties:

  • If the weapon is a guided gun round (e.g. Excalibur) or rocket (e.g. GMLRS), assume it uses MEMS-based INS (Assumed drift: 5nm / hr).
  • Otherwise, if the weapon’s maximum range is under 162NM, assume it uses a “1990s+ tactical weapon”-grade INS (Assumed drift: 0.5 nm / hr)
  • Otherwise for longer-range weapons, assume it uses a “1990s+ high-grade” INS (AIRS etc.)(Assumed drift: 0.05 nm / hr)

The 162NM (300km) threshold is based on the MCTR regime rules, which treat missile weapons with a >300km range as “strategic”.

Both the Side-Enablers framework and the GNSS disruption feature are now available on the new CMO public beta released on the MG forums. Have a look through them and give us your feedback!

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A Christmas gift: Community Scenario Pack #50 now available

December 19, 2024 · Posted in Command · Comment 

Following the release of the new Build 1527 update for Command, which includes the new v509 databases, Brandon Johnson has now also updated the famous Community Scenario Pack (CSP), the Command community’s curated anthology of user-created scenarios. The new update, out just in time for the Christmas celebrations, contains 15 new scenarios:

* Assault on Al Tanf, 2024: Located in Syria on the Iraqi border and within miles of the Jordanian border, the U.S. garrison at al-Tanf has, since 2016, served as a launching point for counter-ISIS operations and training for Syrian opposition factions fighting the jihadist group. Iranian and Iran-backed forces are deployed in close proximity to the al-Tanf desert outpost, which sits on the strategically significant Baghdad-Damascus highway. U.S. forces in al-Tanf established a 55-km de-confliction zone, beyond which lie an array of forces described as either “pro-regime” or “Iran-backed” that have set up checkpoints in the area. Several incidents in recent months underscore al-Tanf’s potential as a flashpoint between U.S. and Iranian and/or Iran-backed forces.

* Caravan, 1982: Since the start of the Iraqi invasion, the northern Persian Gulf has been the site of an intense naval war between the Iranian and Iraqi navies. Most of the fighting has been centered around Iraqi attempts to stop the flow of vital material to the port of Bandar-e Emam Khomeyni. The Iranian navy and air force have devoted significant forces to protect the convoys. Slightly over a year ago, the Iraqi navy first deployed a new weapon in their battle against the convoys, the French Exocet anti-ship missile. A few hours ago, Unit 114 of the Directorate of Technical Equipment detected another Iranian convoy departing from Bushehr.

* Dead from EABOve, 2027: Approximately 2 hours ago, following an earlier announcement by PRC of a blockade of Taiwan, US initiated hostilities with China after interdicting a PLAN SAG attempting to transit the Bashi Channel out to the West Pacific.The Chinese have taken the first blow, now they are ready to return the favor. US bases in the Philippines, Palau and Guam will be in their crosshairs.
You will be required to hold off the numerically superior PLA forces and do so while being subjected to heavy bombardment from PLARF elements.
For your forces to survive, they will be required to disperse, and to refuel and rearm at austere locations. Capturing PRC bases in the South China Sea for follow on operations is also a nice option.
This is a complex 2-day scenario, happening just after the author’s other scenarios “Tighten the Straitjacket” and before “Penetrating the Blockade”.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 1 – France Enters the Fray, 1957: This scenario assumes World War III began in late April of 1957. During most of April in 1957, the Soviets sortied a large number of ships and submarines, claiming they were conducting a series of military exercises.
In the early morning hours of April 25, the Soviets initiated a large and well-coordinated attack on NATO forces.
NATO forces already at sea have been organized into task groups and ordered to hunt down Soviet ships and submarines.  It is critical that NATO remain in control of the sea lanes.  As commander of a French task group centered around the cruiser De Grasse, your mission will be to secure the waters south and southeast of Sardinia.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 1 – Poseidon’s Play, 1957: You are in command of the Greek submarine Poseidon.  She is actually an old American submarine, the Lapon, recently recommissioned and on loan to the Greek government.  However, as her captain, you are sure Poseidon loves her new country as much as she loves the country where she was born.
Today, she will have a chance to prove that love.  As the only Greek vessel in the southern waters of the Mediterranean, Poseidon has an opportunity to intercept a Soviet convoy on its way to the Egyptian city of Marsa Matruh.  The Egyptians appear to have allied with the Soviets, although they have not yet officially declared war.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 1 – The Battle of Elefsina, 1957: In the early morning hours of April 25, 1957, you receive a flash priority message.  There is credible intelligence that a massive Soviet attack against NATO is about to begin.
As the commanding officer of the 114th Combat Wing of the Hellenic Air Force and its three squadrons of F-86E Sabres, your mission will be to help protect Greece from the Soviets and their allies.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 2 – Head ‘Em off at the Sunda Strait, 1957: It is the second day of the war. Shocking news has arrived from Europe.  The Soviet Union has launched massive attacks against European air bases and other military targets.  There are reports that the American carrier Forrestal and the British carrier Bulwark have both been sunk.
You are in command of a British naval squadron in the Far East.  Some elements of the Soviet navy have been operating in your area of responsibility.  It will be your task to destroy these ships and submarines.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 4 – Birmingham Goes Hunting, 1957: It is the fourth day of the war. Intelligence suggests the Soviets have sortied additional submarines and surface groups to threaten shipping in the Atlantic.  You have been placed in charge of one of the task forces assigned to deal with this threat.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 30 – South Dakota Says Goodbye, 1957: It is the end of the first month of the War of 1957. NATO has received reliable intelligence that a large surface group has left Soviet waters.  It appears to be designed to attack NATO shipping trying to cross the Atlantic.
Most NATO ships are already engaged in other theaters of the war.  No carriers and few submarines are available to intercept the battle group.
You are in command of a battle group of available vessels assembled to intercept and destroy the Soviet battle group.  It is a curious collection of ships for the late 1950s, being centered on two World War II-era battleships, South Dakota and California.  Both vessels had been reactivated shortly before hostilities erupted in Europe with the idea of using them as test platforms for new technologies.  However, once the Soviet attacks started, these plans were put on hold.

* Korean Campaign (Operation Dragon Fire), 2018: It is the Spring of 2018, and it appears that Kim Jong-un is finally going to make good on his constant threats to launch an attack into South Korea.

* Operation Ardent Shield, 2030: The world’s worst fear just materialised. Open conflict has erupted between the world’s two superpowers over the South China Sea.
Singapore, as a neutral country but finding many of its fundamental interests in line with upholding the principles of UNCLOS and with keeping the US presence strong in the Pacific, has decided that it will allow US military assets to continue to refuel and resupply in the country, and for limited US military operations to be conducted from the country so long as no direct strikes on Chinese mainland territories are staged from Singapore.

* Operation Sallyport, 2029: In mid-2029, China commenced an intervention under the pretense of restoring order in Papua New Guinea. For Australia and its allies, the stakes were high, as the stability of the South Pacific, regional security, and the influence of Western alliances in the Indo-Pacific hung in the balance. The ensuing operation would determine the future of Papua New Guinea and reshape the power dynamics of the region.

* Ouadi Doum, 1986: In response to Libyan aggression in Chad, President Mitterrand has deployed French forces to Africa.
France is determined to prevent Libya from destabilizing its former colonies, and is concerned about the ability of al-Gaddafi’s government to stage long-range bomber attacks out of the Ouadi Doum airfield.

* Sapphire, 1977: On June 27, 1977, the former French colony of Afars and Issas gained its independence as the country of Djibouti. At first, the FLCS (Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast), a guerrilla organization fighting against French colonial rule, celebrated this victory and was partially absorbed into the new country’s government.
But days after the declaration of independence, a splinter group formed calling for the integration of Djibouti into ‘Greater Somalia’. After gathering support, the group launched their insurgency against the Djibouti government and French forces stationed in the country.
Somali leader Siad Barre had primarily been focused on absorbing the Ogaden region controlled by Ethiopia, but started shifting his focus to the newly independent nation.
Somali forces that had been thought to have been preparing for an invasion of Ethiopia quickly deployed to the border with Djibouti. The French have started sending a large number of reinforcements to Djibouti, but due to the limited infrastructure and short time frame, this has been difficult.
The first units from metropolitan France arrived a short time ago, joining a number of units airlifted in from French territories in the Indian Ocean. French intelligence has assessed that there is a high likelihood that Somalia will launch an invasion in the coming days or hours, before most of the reinforcements can be brought in.

* Soviet Endgame – Seize Giebelstadt3, 1981: At the opening of the Third World War, the Soviet Union launched a continent-wide effort to sweep into NATO countries in a war of conquest.
This scenario focuses on one small aspect of the overall war. As a part of the effort to secure central Germany, the Soviet airborne forces, the VDV are tasked with taking the NATO airfield at Giebelstadt, just south of Würzburg.

The new community scenario pack is, as always, available for download at the Command Team site, and also on the Steam workshop.

The CSP now proudly counts 618 scenarios in its stable!

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