From commercial toy-quads to free-ranging hunter-killers: Drone-autonomy levels in Command

April 5, 2025 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment

“True drone autonomy isn’t just about flying without a pilot—it’s about making real-time decisions in unpredictable environments, with limited data, constrained power, and no room for error”
– ChatGPT, reflecting on its siblings on the front line

Uncrewed combat & support platforms (aka “drones”) are all the rage these days in defence circles, and not without good reason. However, they suffer from a fundamental limitation compared to more “traditional” crewed platforms: When not under direct human control (ie. in a realistically comms-challenged environment in any non-lopsided conflict), their ability to autonomously carry out their intended mission is drastically curtailed. By how much? Well, contrary to men, not all drones are created equal – and hence one of the new major simulation features of Command: variable drone autonomy levels.

The question of how much autonomy we are willing to grant to conscious-less machines armed with lethal weaponry has long escaped the confines of legal & ethical theoretical discussions, and is already hammered in the front lines of Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere, as well as the virtual battlefields of the major powers where doctrine, tactics and operational art are forged (see this excellent article by Bill Sweetman on the dilemmas of how best to employ CCAs in a future peer conflict).

Public western/NATO literature on the subject commonly refers to different degrees of “drone autonomy” and then assigns individual uncrewed systems to each of them, to distinguish their autonomous capability. The dev team’s chosen structure closely (though not precisely) follows this public nomenclature. Let us explore the different levels and what they actually mean in the field, when their comms are lost:

– Remotely Piloted: These are the cheap & cheerful quadcopters or small-sized wingcraft or UGVs/USVs you can buy at your local store and have up and flying / rolling / sailing within minutes. Due to their low cost and high numbers, they are very popular in battlefields where comms are not contested. They are remotely-piloted and entirely dependent on their human operator for control. If comms are disrupted, they will stick with their last-ordered course and speed until comms are re-established; if they are not, then they’ll run out of fuel/energy and halt in place (or crash if airborne). While offline, they are unable to take any initiative in order to further their mission.

– Self-Recovering: Things are slightly improving here; if the comms link is lost, these units will loiter/hold at their current location and try to rejoin the comms grid; if successful they will resume their mission, otherwise they will autonomously return to their deployment base/host. It doesn’t sound like much, but retrieving back effortlessly your comms-disrupted force rather than losing them to every comms-jammer out there really does make a difference.

– Changeable Mission: (A more accurate description here might be “Flexible in-mission behavior”, but we don’t get to choose the terminology). A pretty significant jump in autonomy here: The offline vehicle will actually move ahead and try to perform its assigned mission. The bad news: Because of the lack of human oversight, the platform will not perform any pre-emptive checks for own damage, bingo/joker fuel status or winchester/shotgun weapon status – checks that (under human supervision & positive control) would trigger an immediate abort & RTB. In other words, it will press on to its mission even if it is objectively incapable of actually pulling it off and surviving.

– Fault/Event Adaptive: Another major step forward in intelligent behavior here: The platform will actually perform pre-emptive checks for own damage, bingo/joker fuel status or winchester/shotgun weapon status, and thus will avoid needlessly kamikazeing itself into a hopeless situation.

– Multi-Vehicle Coordination: Drones can be quite more effective when they are used in big groups (aka “swarms”). This level of autonomy allows a drone to participate in such a group – but only strictly as a group member. It can perform independent maneuvers only if it is the group’s designated leader.

– Battlespace Cognizant: This is an absolutely huge leap forward, and allows an offline unit to finally evaluate targets and threats on its own, rather than sticking to pre-assigned targets only. It can also maneuvers independently even if its part of a swarm, it can intelligently change its desired home base (though only from available fixed bases, not mobile bases like aircraft carriers) and can evaluate UNREP or air-to-air-refueling opportunities.

– Fully Autonomous: Now we are stepping firmly into Cyberdyne Systems territory. Fully-autonomous drones treat comms isolation almost as a nuisance rather than a crippling handicap: In addition to freely evaluating the targets & threats within their predefined mission parameters, they are also free to evaluate and engage any targets of opportunity that are relevant to their available weaponry. They are also able to modify their mission course instead of sticking to their predefined one, as well as changing their home base destination, either fixed or mobile. Such a unit will most definitely ask you for your clothes, your boots and your motorcycle – and you’ll be wise to accede. If the thought of heavily-armed robots having this freedom of action doesn’t give you pause, you might had been an excellent Carmageddon player.

The autonomy level of a drone is displayed on the DB viewer:

It is also accessible (and editable) through the Lua API:

theU = ScenEdit_GetUnit({name='Anka-S UAV', guid='4FTZEE-0HNA5SMK3O9K4'})
theU.autonomylevel = 1500
print(theU.autonomylevel)

(Note: In DB3000 v510 and previous versions, most drones have their stock autonomy level set to “Undefined”. We therefore recommend using v511+ when using this feature)

One common characteristic of off-grid drones is that, when they get disconnected from their side network, their mission becomes “fixed” for them. In simulation terms, they obtain and use a “private snapshot” copy of their mission state as it was at the moment of disconnect, and use that as reference. Any changes on their original assigned mission are NOT reflected on their private snapshot; for example if the doctrine or ROE settings change, or the area of a patrol shifts around, the disconnected drone sticks to its “known” mission parameters; this is one of the key operational drawbacks of even the most advanced autonomous drones.

The Mission Editor has been adjusted to display such “snapshot” missions, if they are the selected ones (for example, if the player is in direct control of an isolated drone and selects its mission):

The ME window now also more clearly displays platforms who are assigned to a mission but are currently off-grid:

When a unit is off-grid, any attempts to transfer it to another mission or change its mission parameters will fail.

Variable drone autonomy levels is an opt-in scenario realism feature (disabled by default, to avoid disrupting existing scenarios). It is one of the biggest new simulation features of Command, and one of the key new additions on the new upcoming major update.

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Command: Fail Safe has been released!

February 25, 2025 · Posted in Command · Comment

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Modern warfare comes knocking: Side-enablers and GNSS disruption

January 25, 2025 · Posted in Command, Command PE · Comment

Quickly now, raise your hand if these headlines sound familiar:

These and other similar titles underline a crucial military transformation during our lifetimes. Modern warfare is not “WW2 but with better weapons”, and the comforts of post-Cold War COIN & intervention / regime-change ops are no longer to be taken for granted. The GPS navigation systems guiding modern platforms and weapons will likely be disrupted (in fact count yourself lucky if the satellite constellation above you survives), and the BLOS comms that forces rely upon for everything from cell-phone connectivity to drone control may or may not be available, theater-wide or locally.

So, how to represent these threats and vulnerabilities, and the opportunities arising from them, in Command?

Side Enablers

What we came up with is the concept and framework of “Side Enablers” (aka “theater access options”): Capabilities that act as force multipliers, enabling options for action – or taking them off the table if they become unavailable.

The most common such enabler is access to satellite-based navigation, particularly with regards to weapon guidance (and more recently, autonomous operation of drones). GPS is of course the most commonly referred example, but GLONASS (Russia), BeiDou (China) and NavIC (India) are also other options.

Such enablers are now available for configuration in Command when editing the properties of Sides in the Scenario Editor:

Clicking the “Enablers” button brings up the available enablers for the selected side:

Checking or unchecking each checkbox enables or disables this capability for the selected side.

Apart from the top Side-level, these enabler items are also configurable on a local basis. The idea here is that in many cases the ability (or lack thereof) to use a certain functionality may be restricted geographically; Starlink’s “no Ukraine” geofencing for its LEO-BLOS comms service is a recent example, but another common case may be the localized jamming/spoofing of GPS on a town or frontline of interest. The reverse may also be true: A given service may be generally unavailable theater-wide but available on a specific area (local beacons for both PNT/GNSS and comms are rapidly proliferating; you can now fit some of them even on artillery shells).

The way we model area-specific availability is through the area & reference-points manager:

By selecting a zone and clicking on the new “Enablers” button, we get access to the same menu of enabler options as on the side level. Embedding this ability on zones also allows taking advantage of all the nice properties already present in them, such as anchoring them on units, contacts or reference points.

Given that the (non)availability of these services can be highly dependent on events happening during the sim execution (or player decisions), it makes sense that the enablers themselves are configurable also through Lua scripting. Here is an example of fetching the enablers for a given zone and modifying them:

local s = VP_GetSide({name='side-A'})
print(s)
local z = s.standardzones
local myz = s:getstandardzone(z[1].guid)
print(myz.enablers)
myz.enablers = {GNSS_GLONASS = true, GNSS_GPS = false}
print(myz.enablers)

GNSS disruption

So, what do all these enablers actually buy/deny you “in the field”?

The first concrete implementation of the enablers framework is, to no-one’s surprise, GNSS disruption. This is a large topic of discussion in western defence circles as an acknowledged vulnerability, given that so many different weapon systems since Desert Storm have come to rely on GPS navigation for guidance – and this trend has been also subsequently replicated in Russia, China & India (to our knowledge, the pan-European Galileo system has not yet been adopted as a guidance component on any fielded weapon system).

GNSS disruption (in the form or jamming, spoofing or complete denial of service) is a huge and highly technical subject, but in the context of terminal weapons guidance its effects are fairly simple: It significantly increases the CEP figure of anti-surface weapons, thus significantly degrading their accuracy. Such weapons typically rely on an internal inertial navigation system (INS) which acts as the primary navigation reference, with the GNSS providing a regular correction to the INS’s inevitable drift. If GNSS is denied, the weapon has to rely entirely on its INS for terminal guidance.

When a weapon is denied a GNSS update, a “NOGNSS” warning is shown next to the weapon icon on the map, to indicate that this weapon is suffering from such degradation:

When the weapon’s impact is evaluated, the INS drift due to GNSS denial is taken into account and may significantly raise the final CEP value used in the impact evaluation. This is presented in the message log, as in this example:

> 8/4/2017 10:08:14 – Weapon: GBU-39/B SDB #993 has been without a GNSS update for 6 min 49 sec. Weapon has INS: 1990s+ tactical weapon INS. Max drift: 105m. Actual drift (CEP increase): 79m

Notice in this example the significant difference between max and actual drift: The max drift represents the maximum deviation from the DMPI if one assumes that all drift perturbations will cumulatively swing the weapon away from the aimpoint. A more (statistically) likely case is that the actual deviation will be somewhere between zero and max; in this case 79 meters.

There is a popular misconception on public discourse, that GNSS disruption can instantly turn a weapon useless. This is a gross exaggeration. The actual effect of such degradation on a weapon’s impact accuracy, and to its overall effectiveness, will strongly depend on the inherent accuracy of the weapon’s INS system, the time the weapon spends in a degraded state (INS drifts with time, not distance covered), the weapon’s warhead type and yield, as well as the type and physical dimensions of the aimed target.

Some recent examples illustrating this:

According to persistent reports, ground-launched SDB (GLSDB) bombs have been ineffective in the Ukraine theater due to extensive GPS jamming/spoofing. This makes sense for a weapon like SDB, whose penetrator-explosive warhead is highly dependent on high accuracy (a near-miss does not produce any proximity damage; it’s direct-hit or bust); combined with an increased flight time (ie. more time to be exposed to GNSS disruption, depending on the reach of enemy EM activity) this creates ample opportunity to disrupt the weapon sufficiently to make it a clean miss.
On the same theater, GMLRS guided rockets have reportedly been highly successful despite facing the very same jamming activity against them. Why? The warheads of these rockets are area weapons (they disperse bomblets) so a near miss usually is as good as a spot-on direct hit. Additionally, their small flight time reduces the opportunity for significant jamming and thus diversion. (Reportedly air-launched SDBs, the very same type as ground-launched by GLSDB, have also been a popular weapon. Why? Presumably the shorter flight time compared to the ground-launched variant makes for a sharply reduced window of GNSS-jamming vulnerability.)
High-velocity weapons in general have an inherent advantage in such conditions because of the time-based drift on INS systems. This is an additional reason that high-speed systems (incl. hypersonics) are a popular avenue for research and development.

Note #1: The current GNSS disruption model applies only to weapons that use INS+GNSS for terminal guidance (JDAM being the prime example), and NOT to weapons that combine INS+GNSS for mid-course guidance with homing sensors for terminal guidance (e.g. most modern cruise missiles). There are a number of reasons for this, incl. the complexity of representing “actual” vs “perceived” weapon position (cue the “missile knows where it is” memes…), as well as the fact that such systems use terminal homing precisely in order to compensate for mid-course guidance errors and thus are less susceptible to GNSS disruption.

Note #2: Currently there is no distinct field in the database to mark the INS performance level of each individual weapon. For this reason a simple “deduction” algorithm is used, based on the weapon properties:

If the weapon is a guided gun round (e.g. Excalibur) or rocket (e.g. GMLRS), assume it uses MEMS-based INS (Assumed drift: 5nm / hr).
Otherwise, if the weapon’s maximum range is under 162NM, assume it uses a “1990s+ tactical weapon”-grade INS (Assumed drift: 0.5 nm / hr)
Otherwise for longer-range weapons, assume it uses a “1990s+ high-grade” INS (AIRS etc.)(Assumed drift: 0.05 nm / hr)

The 162NM (300km) threshold is based on the MCTR regime rules, which treat missile weapons with a >300km range as “strategic”.

Both the Side-Enablers framework and the GNSS disruption feature are now available on the new CMO public beta released on the MG forums. Have a look through them and give us your feedback!

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A Christmas gift: Community Scenario Pack #50 now available

December 19, 2024 · Posted in Command · Comment

Following the release of the new Build 1527 update for Command, which includes the new v509 databases, Brandon Johnson has now also updated the famous Community Scenario Pack (CSP), the Command community’s curated anthology of user-created scenarios. The new update, out just in time for the Christmas celebrations, contains 15 new scenarios:

* Assault on Al Tanf, 2024: Located in Syria on the Iraqi border and within miles of the Jordanian border, the U.S. garrison at al-Tanf has, since 2016, served as a launching point for counter-ISIS operations and training for Syrian opposition factions fighting the jihadist group. Iranian and Iran-backed forces are deployed in close proximity to the al-Tanf desert outpost, which sits on the strategically significant Baghdad-Damascus highway. U.S. forces in al-Tanf established a 55-km de-confliction zone, beyond which lie an array of forces described as either “pro-regime” or “Iran-backed” that have set up checkpoints in the area. Several incidents in recent months underscore al-Tanf’s potential as a flashpoint between U.S. and Iranian and/or Iran-backed forces.

* Caravan, 1982: Since the start of the Iraqi invasion, the northern Persian Gulf has been the site of an intense naval war between the Iranian and Iraqi navies. Most of the fighting has been centered around Iraqi attempts to stop the flow of vital material to the port of Bandar-e Emam Khomeyni. The Iranian navy and air force have devoted significant forces to protect the convoys. Slightly over a year ago, the Iraqi navy first deployed a new weapon in their battle against the convoys, the French Exocet anti-ship missile. A few hours ago, Unit 114 of the Directorate of Technical Equipment detected another Iranian convoy departing from Bushehr.

* Dead from EABOve, 2027: Approximately 2 hours ago, following an earlier announcement by PRC of a blockade of Taiwan, US initiated hostilities with China after interdicting a PLAN SAG attempting to transit the Bashi Channel out to the West Pacific.The Chinese have taken the first blow, now they are ready to return the favor. US bases in the Philippines, Palau and Guam will be in their crosshairs.
You will be required to hold off the numerically superior PLA forces and do so while being subjected to heavy bombardment from PLARF elements.
For your forces to survive, they will be required to disperse, and to refuel and rearm at austere locations. Capturing PRC bases in the South China Sea for follow on operations is also a nice option.
This is a complex 2-day scenario, happening just after the author’s other scenarios “Tighten the Straitjacket” and before “Penetrating the Blockade”.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 1 – France Enters the Fray, 1957: This scenario assumes World War III began in late April of 1957. During most of April in 1957, the Soviets sortied a large number of ships and submarines, claiming they were conducting a series of military exercises.
In the early morning hours of April 25, the Soviets initiated a large and well-coordinated attack on NATO forces.
NATO forces already at sea have been organized into task groups and ordered to hunt down Soviet ships and submarines. It is critical that NATO remain in control of the sea lanes. As commander of a French task group centered around the cruiser De Grasse, your mission will be to secure the waters south and southeast of Sardinia.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 1 – Poseidon’s Play, 1957: You are in command of the Greek submarine Poseidon. She is actually an old American submarine, the Lapon, recently recommissioned and on loan to the Greek government. However, as her captain, you are sure Poseidon loves her new country as much as she loves the country where she was born.
Today, she will have a chance to prove that love. As the only Greek vessel in the southern waters of the Mediterranean, Poseidon has an opportunity to intercept a Soviet convoy on its way to the Egyptian city of Marsa Matruh. The Egyptians appear to have allied with the Soviets, although they have not yet officially declared war.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 1 – The Battle of Elefsina, 1957: In the early morning hours of April 25, 1957, you receive a flash priority message. There is credible intelligence that a massive Soviet attack against NATO is about to begin.
As the commanding officer of the 114th Combat Wing of the Hellenic Air Force and its three squadrons of F-86E Sabres, your mission will be to help protect Greece from the Soviets and their allies.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 2 – Head ‘Em off at the Sunda Strait, 1957: It is the second day of the war. Shocking news has arrived from Europe. The Soviet Union has launched massive attacks against European air bases and other military targets. There are reports that the American carrier Forrestal and the British carrier Bulwark have both been sunk.
You are in command of a British naval squadron in the Far East. Some elements of the Soviet navy have been operating in your area of responsibility. It will be your task to destroy these ships and submarines.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 4 – Birmingham Goes Hunting, 1957: It is the fourth day of the war. Intelligence suggests the Soviets have sortied additional submarines and surface groups to threaten shipping in the Atlantic. You have been placed in charge of one of the task forces assigned to deal with this threat.

* Khrushchev’s War, Day 30 – South Dakota Says Goodbye, 1957: It is the end of the first month of the War of 1957. NATO has received reliable intelligence that a large surface group has left Soviet waters. It appears to be designed to attack NATO shipping trying to cross the Atlantic.
Most NATO ships are already engaged in other theaters of the war. No carriers and few submarines are available to intercept the battle group.
You are in command of a battle group of available vessels assembled to intercept and destroy the Soviet battle group. It is a curious collection of ships for the late 1950s, being centered on two World War II-era battleships, South Dakota and California. Both vessels had been reactivated shortly before hostilities erupted in Europe with the idea of using them as test platforms for new technologies. However, once the Soviet attacks started, these plans were put on hold.

* Korean Campaign (Operation Dragon Fire), 2018: It is the Spring of 2018, and it appears that Kim Jong-un is finally going to make good on his constant threats to launch an attack into South Korea.

* Operation Ardent Shield, 2030: The world’s worst fear just materialised. Open conflict has erupted between the world’s two superpowers over the South China Sea.
Singapore, as a neutral country but finding many of its fundamental interests in line with upholding the principles of UNCLOS and with keeping the US presence strong in the Pacific, has decided that it will allow US military assets to continue to refuel and resupply in the country, and for limited US military operations to be conducted from the country so long as no direct strikes on Chinese mainland territories are staged from Singapore.

* Operation Sallyport, 2029: In mid-2029, China commenced an intervention under the pretense of restoring order in Papua New Guinea. For Australia and its allies, the stakes were high, as the stability of the South Pacific, regional security, and the influence of Western alliances in the Indo-Pacific hung in the balance. The ensuing operation would determine the future of Papua New Guinea and reshape the power dynamics of the region.

* Ouadi Doum, 1986: In response to Libyan aggression in Chad, President Mitterrand has deployed French forces to Africa.
France is determined to prevent Libya from destabilizing its former colonies, and is concerned about the ability of al-Gaddafi’s government to stage long-range bomber attacks out of the Ouadi Doum airfield.

* Sapphire, 1977: On June 27, 1977, the former French colony of Afars and Issas gained its independence as the country of Djibouti. At first, the FLCS (Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast), a guerrilla organization fighting against French colonial rule, celebrated this victory and was partially absorbed into the new country’s government.
But days after the declaration of independence, a splinter group formed calling for the integration of Djibouti into ‘Greater Somalia’. After gathering support, the group launched their insurgency against the Djibouti government and French forces stationed in the country.
Somali leader Siad Barre had primarily been focused on absorbing the Ogaden region controlled by Ethiopia, but started shifting his focus to the newly independent nation.
Somali forces that had been thought to have been preparing for an invasion of Ethiopia quickly deployed to the border with Djibouti. The French have started sending a large number of reinforcements to Djibouti, but due to the limited infrastructure and short time frame, this has been difficult.
The first units from metropolitan France arrived a short time ago, joining a number of units airlifted in from French territories in the Indian Ocean. French intelligence has assessed that there is a high likelihood that Somalia will launch an invasion in the coming days or hours, before most of the reinforcements can be brought in.

* Soviet Endgame – Seize Giebelstadt3, 1981: At the opening of the Third World War, the Soviet Union launched a continent-wide effort to sweep into NATO countries in a war of conquest.
This scenario focuses on one small aspect of the overall war. As a part of the effort to secure central Germany, the Soviet airborne forces, the VDV are tasked with taking the NATO airfield at Giebelstadt, just south of Würzburg.

The new community scenario pack is, as always, available for download at the Command Team site, and also on the Steam workshop.

The CSP now proudly counts 618 scenarios in its stable!

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Promises kept: Command-PE v2.4.1 and the new sim manual now available

December 11, 2024 · Posted in Command PE · Comment

Last September, at the most recent (and most awesome) Command User Event held at Quantico, we showed off the then-imminent-to-release v2.4 major release to Command PE. We also stated that a “hotfix” update was scheduled for release by the end of the year, and that the much-anticipated CPE Simulation Manual would also be made available to current PE license holders in the same timeframe, even in early draft form.

As the year is now drawing to a close, we are happy to fulfill our promises:

* Command-PE v2.4.1 is now available for download to all current users of CPE. Intended originally as merely a hotfix release containing all the tweaks and fixes since the original 2.4 release, it has morphed into a substantial update in its own right.
Its biggest new features are the new “pin-cushion view” option for displaying aerospace units at their true altitudes (this got a lot of attention also at I/ITSEC last week), the tabular & machine-parsible “butchers bill” (list of losses & expenditures) and the option for repeatable-loop movement style on mining missions (ie. you can now define in advance the specific pattern to follow when laying mines, as well as related settings such as interval).
The new update also contains a whole slew of improvements and tweaks to the simulation engine, as well as the latest v509 release of the DB3000 and CWDB databases.

* The first version of the CPE Sim Manual that we deem share-worthy is now available. This document acts as the central point of reference for the overall design and internal simulation mechanics of CPE (and CMO) both for the Command dev team as well as professional customers (this is distinct and separate from the existing CPE & CMO user manuals, which deliberately focus on the user interface and gameplay options).
The sim manual is still in very early draft form, with numerous placeholders, unfilled or unfinished sections; even so, every single user who has glimpsed at it so far has found it extremely eye-opening, useful and illuminating. So we believe the same will hold true for any of our customers who wish to gain a deeper understanding of how Command’s simulation engine works. The sim manual is not generally available for download, but can be provided to active CPE license holders upon request.

The CPE dev team is already hard at work, developing a new set of features (and especially a pair of big whammies) that will define the next milestone of CPE some time within 2025. Stay tuned!

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